Vulnerability of Finitely-long Blockchains in Securing Data
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Recently, blockchain has been applied in various fields to secure data exchanges and storage in decentralized systems. In a blockchain application where the task of the application which makes use of the data stored in a blockchain has to be accomplished by a time instant, the employed blockchain is essentially finitely-long. In this paper, we consider a general finitely-long blockchain model which is generalized from most existing works on finitely-long blockchain applications, and take the first step towards characterizing the vulnerability of finitely-long blockchains in securing data against double-spending attacks. For the first time, we develop a general closed-form expression for the probability of success in launching a double-spending attack on a finitely-long blockchain. This probability essentially characterizes the vulnerability of finitely-long blockchains. Then, we prove that the probability of success in launching a double-spending attack on a finitely-long blockchain is no greater than that on an infinitely-long blockchain, which implies that finitely-long blockchains are less vulnerable to double-spending attacks than infinitely-long blockchains. Moreover, we show that unlike infinitely-long blockchains which can be surely paralyzed by a 51 blockchains are more resistant to 51
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